今日俄罗斯文章 —— 特朗普能帮助结束乌克兰战争吗？

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These statements, however, are balanced by an emphasis on what used to be called diplomacy: “At the same time,” we read, “Trump was open to cooperation with Russia and dialogue with Putin. Trump expressed respect for Putin as a world leader and did not demonize him in public statements … This was a transactional approach to US-Russia relations … to find ways to coexist and lower tensions … while standing firm on American security interests.”

特朗普将对与俄罗斯合作和对话持开放态度，并给予普京作为一个世界领导人应有的尊敬

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That already is a tone that Kiev cannot but find disconcerting. Because under Biden, US strategy – and therefore that of the collective West – has been built not merely on an extremely belligerent approach (as if that were not bad enough already) but, more importantly and more detrimentally, on the obsessive idea that there is no alternative. Everything, to its adherents, is “appeasement” except constant escalation to “win.” There is no room for genuine quid pro quos and compromise. That attitude is vital to America’s unrelenting support for Ukraine and, in particular, the fact that it has crossed one red line (meaning those previously recognized by Washington itself) after the other, with no (good) end in sight.

在拜登时期，西方集团对俄罗斯采取了不妥协的极端敌视态度，越过了一条又一条红线，不知道怎么收场

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Hence, a Trumpist approach that is also anything but “soft” on Russia, while, however, acknowledging the possibility of de-escalation through negotiation is already a major departure from current US policy. You could even think of it as being inspired by the Reaganite foreign policy of the 1980s, which also combined pronounced “toughness” with a genuine readiness to compromise. Yet there would be one big difference: Toward the end of the Cold War, Washington was dealing with a pliable, even naïve Soviet leadership. That was a grave mistake – if made for mostly admirably idealistic reasons – that Russia’s current leaders see very clearly, are still angry about, and will not repeat.

特朗普的政策将是对现有政策的重大改变。从中可以看到里根政府在八十年代时对苏政策（强硬态度加务实妥协）的影子。但是现在的俄罗斯领导人不会像当时的苏联领导人那样天真和轻信。

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In the case of the war in Ukraine, this means that any settlement, even with a newly “transactional” Washington “coming to the table” would involve not one but two “tough” players: Moscow will not agree to any compromise that fails to factor in that it has gained the upper hand in this war. That, in turn, means that, beyond the basic Trumpist mood of conditional conciliatoriness, details will be decisive.

莫斯科不会接受任何一种不考虑到它已经在战争中占据上风的妥协。所以，细节将决定成败。

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Unfortunately for the Zelensky regime and fortunately for everyone else (yes, including many Ukrainians who won’t have to die in a proxy war anymore once peace comes), in that domain as well, the realm of the concrete and specific, the plan developed by Kellogg and Fleitz shows some progress. The authors, first of all, recognize important elements of reality that the current US leadership is either lying or in denial about: for instance, that this is a proxy war as well as a war of attrition, that Zelensky’s “10-point plan” (essentially a blueprint for what could only happen if Ukraine were to win the war, that is, never) “went nowhere,” and that Ukraine cannot sustain the war demographically.

对泽连斯基当局来说不幸的是，而对于几乎所有其他人（包括大多数乌克兰人）都幸运的是，这个（特朗普初步认可的）新计划考虑到了具体的实际情况：

这场战争是一场代理人战争，也是一场消耗战

泽连斯基的十点计划根本不值一提

乌克兰的人口无法支撑长期战争

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They also acknowledge that Russia will refuse to take part in peace talks or agree to an initial ceasefire if the West doesn’t “put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period.” In fact, an “extended period” will not suffice; Moscow has been clear that never means never. But Kellogg and Fleitz may be formulating their ideas carefully with a view to how much their readers in America can take at this point.

乌克兰加入北约的问题将被长期推迟。莫斯科要求乌克兰永远不加入北约，永远就是永远。但克劳格和弗莱兹在撰写这一计划时也许考虑到美国（统治集团的）读者目前可以接受的程度。

（编注：这句话的意思是，一旦特朗普上台，乌克兰“永远”不加入北约的问题也可以谈判）

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The plan also, again realistically, raises the option of offering a partial and, eventually, complete dropping of sanctions against Russia. Ukraine, on the other side, would not have to give up the aim of recovering all its territory, but – a crucial restriction – would have to agree to pursue it by diplomatic means only. The implication is, of course, that Kiev would have to give up de facto control over territory in the first place.

这一计划将提议部分解除对俄罗斯的制裁，并最终全部解除制裁。乌克兰不必正式放弃已失去的领土，但必须承诺将来只用外交手段来收复失地（也就是基辅必须接受事实上失去这些土地）。

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And there you have it: This is a proposal that, pared down to essentials, foresees territorial concessions and no NATO membership for Ukraine. It's no wonder that Kellogg and Leitz conclude their paper by admitting that “the Ukrainian government,” “the Ukrainian people” (that is sure to be an over-generalization, by the way), and “their supporters” in the West will have trouble accepting this kind of negotiated peace. We could add: especially after more than two years of an avoidable (as the authors also recognize) and bloody proxy war. Yet that tragedy has already happened. We can wish it had not, but we cannot undo the past. The real question is about the future. Kellogg and Leitz, and Trump as well, if he will follow such a policy, are right that the dying must end, and that the only way to make it end – as well as avoid further escalation, perhaps to global war – is a compromise settlement built on reality.

悲剧已经发生。但要结束悲剧并避免全球战争，就必须在现实基础上达成妥协。

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Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian and expert on international politics. He has a BA in Modern History from Oxford University, an MSc in International History from the LSE, and a PhD in History from Princeton University. He has held scholarships at the Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and directed the Center for Urban History in Lviv, Ukraine. Originally from Germany, he has lived in the UK, Ukraine, Poland, the USA, and Turkey.

该文作者是德国历史学家

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特朗普上台是想换掉美国资产阶级政府以往热衷的世界政策，或者至少大幅度修改